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Abstract: Accident models play a critical role in accident investigation and analysis. Most
traditional models are based on an underlying chain of events. These models, however, have serious
limitations when used for complex, socio-technical systems. Previously, Leveson proposed a new
accident model (STAMP) based on system theory where the basic concept is not an event but a
constraint. This paper shows how STAMP can be applied to accident analysis using three diﬀerent
views or models of the accident process and proposes a notation for describing this process.
1 Introduction
Most accident investigation and analysis rests on the use of event chain models, i.e., the accident
causation is described as a chain of failure events and human errors that led up to the actual loss
event. Such models are limited in their ability to handle system accidents (arising from dysfunc-
tional interactions among components and not just component failures), software-related accidents,
complex human decision making, and system adaptation or migration toward an accident over time
[7].
In response to the limitation of event chain models, models based on systems theory have
been proposed for use in accident analysis (see, for example, Rasmussen-Svedung [11]). STAMP
(Systems-Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes) is one such model that has been recently
proposed [7]. Previously, only a description of the theoretical model underlying STAMP has been
published. This paper shows how STAMP can be used in accident analysis and suggests notations
that might be appropriate for representing and communicating the process leading to the accident.
The next section brieﬂy describes STAMP. Then its application to a complex socio-technical
accident is illustrated by applying it to the bacterial contamination of a water system in Walkerton
Ontario in May 2000 where 2300 people became ill (in a town of 4800) and seven died [8].
2 Brief Description of STAMP
Accident models based on system theory consider accidents as arising from the interactions among
system components and usually do not specify single causal variables or factors [5]. Whereas
industrial (occupational) safety models focus on unsafe acts or conditions, classic system safety
models instead look at what went wrong with the system’s operation or organization to allow the
accident to take place.
∗This research was partially supported by NASA Engineering for Complex Systems Grant NAG2-1543 and NSF
ITR grant CCR-0085829.
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In STAMP (Systems-Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes), accidents are conceived as
resulting not from component failures, but from inadequate control or enforcement of safety-related
constraints on the development, design, and operation of the system. Safety is viewed as a control
problem, and accidents occur when component failures, external disturbances, and/or dysfunctional
interactions among system components are not adequately handled. In the space shuttle Challenger
accident, for example, the O-rings did not adequately control propellant gas release by sealing a tiny
gap in the ﬁeld joint. In the Mars Polar Lander loss, the software did not adequately control the
descent speed of the spacecraft—it misinterpreted noise from a Hall eﬀect sensor as an indication
the spacecraft had reached the surface of the planet.
Accidents such as these, involving engineering design errors, may in turn stem from inadequate
control over the development process. Control is also imposed by the management functions in an
organization—the Challenger accident involved inadequate controls in the launch-decision process,
for example—and by the social and political system within which the organization exists.
While events reﬂect the eﬀects of dysfunctional interactions and inadequate enforcement of
safety constraints, the inadequate control itself is only indirectly reﬂected by the events—the events
are the result of the inadequate control. The control structure itself, therefore, must be examined
to determine why the controls were inadequate to maintain the constraints on safe behavior and
why the events occurred—for example, why the hot air gases were not controlled by the O-rings
in the Challenger ﬁeld joints, why the designers arrived at an unsafe design, and why management
decisions were made to launch despite warnings that it might not be safe to do so.
Systems are viewed, in this approach, as interrelated components that are kept in a state of
dynamic equilibrium by feedback loops of information and control. A system is not treated as a
static design, but as a dynamic process that is continually adapting to achieve its ends and to react
to changes in itself and its environment. The original design must not only enforce appropriate
constraints on behavior to ensure safe operation, but it must continue to operate safely as changes
and adaptations occur over time. Accidents then are viewed as the result of ﬂawed processes
involving interactions among system components, including people, societal and organizational
structures, engineering activities, and physical system components.
STAMP is constructed from three basic concepts: constraints, hierarchical levels of control, and
process models. These concepts, in turn, give rise to a classiﬁcation of control ﬂaws that can lead
to accidents. Each of these is described below.
2.1 Constraints and Hierarchical Levels of Control
The most basic concept in STAMP is not an event, but a constraint. In systems theory or control
theory, systems are viewed as hierarchical structures where each level imposes constraints on the
activity of the level beneath it—that is, constraints or lack of constraints at a higher level allow
or control lower-level behavior [2]. Safety-related constraints specify those relationships among
system variables that constitute the nonhazardous or safe system states—for example, the power
must never be on when the access door to the high-voltage power source is open; pilots in a combat
zone must always be able to identify potential targets as hostile or friendly; and the public health
system must prevent the exposure of the public to contaminated water.
Instead of viewing accidents as the result of an initiating (root cause) event in a series of
events leading to a loss, accidents are viewed as resulting from interactions among components
that violate the system safety constraints. The control processes that enforce these constraints
must limit system behavior to the safe changes and adaptations implied by the constraints. This
deﬁnition of accidents ﬁts both classic component failure accidents as well as system accidents.
Figure 1 shows a generic hierarchical control model. Accidents result from inadequate enforce-
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ment of constraints on behavior (e.g., the physical system, engineering design, management, and
regulatory behavior) at each level of the socio-technical system.
The model in Figure 1 has two basic hierarchical control structures—one for system develop-
ment (on the left) and one for system operation (on the right)—with interactions between them.
An aircraft manufacturer, for example, might only have system development under its immediate
control, but safety involves both development and operational use of the aircraft, and neither can
be accomplished successfully in isolation: Safety must be designed into the system, and safety
during operation depends partly on the original design and partly on eﬀective control over opera-
tions. Manufacturers must communicate to their customers the assumptions about the operational
environment upon which the safety analysis was based, as well as information about safe operating
procedures. The operational environment, in turn, provides feedback to the manufacturer about
the performance of the system during operations.
Between the hierarchical levels of each control structure, eﬀective communication channels are
needed, both a downward reference channel providing the information necessary to impose con-
straints on the level below and a measuring channel to provide feedback about how eﬀectively the
constraints were enforced. For example, company management in the development process struc-
ture may provide a safety policy, standards, and resources to project management and in return
receive status reports, risk assessment, and incident reports as feedback about the status of the
project with respect to the safety constraints.
The safety control structure often changes over time, which accounts for the observation that
accidents in complex systems frequently involve a migration of the system toward a state where a
small deviation (in the physical system or in human operator behavior) can lead to a catastrophe.
The foundation for an accident is often laid years before. One event may trigger the loss, but if
that event had not happened, another one would have. Union Carbide and the Indian govern-
ment blamed the Bhopal MIC (methyl isocyanate) release (among the worst industrial accidents
in history) on human error—the improper cleaning of a pipe at the chemical plant. However,
the maintenance worker was, in fact, only a minor and somewhat irrelevant player in the loss [6].
Instead, degradation in the safety margin occurred over time and without any particular single
decision to do so but simply as a series of decisions that moved the plant slowly toward a situation
where any slight error would lead to a major accident:
The stage for an accidental course of events very likely is prepared through time by
the normal eﬀorts of many actors in their respective daily work context, responding to
the standing request to be more productive and less costly. Ultimately, a quite normal
variation in somebody’s behavior can then release an accident. Had this ‘root cause’
been avoided by some additional safety measure, the accident would very likely be
released by another cause at another point in time. In other words, an explanation of
the accident in terms of events, acts, and errors is not very useful for design of improved
systems [9].
Degradation of the safety-control structure over time may be related to asynchronous evolution
[5], where one part of a system changes without the related necessary changes in other parts.
Changes to subsystems may be carefully designed, but consideration of their eﬀects on other parts of
the system, including the control aspects, may be neglected or inadequate. Asynchronous evolution
may also occur when one part of a properly designed system deteriorates. In both these cases,
the erroneous expectations of users or system components about the behavior of the changed or
degraded subsystem may lead to accidents. The Ariane 5 trajectory changed from that of the
Ariane 4, but the inertial reference system software did not. One factor in the loss of contact with
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Figure 1: General Form of a Model of Socio-Technical Control.
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the SOHO (SOlar Heliospheric Observatory) spacecraft in 1998 was the failure to communicate to
operators that a functional change had been made in a procedure to perform gyro spin-down.
In the analysis of an accident using STAMP, the required constraints to provide safe behavior are
ﬁrst identiﬁed for each level of the control structure and then the socio-technical system is examined
to determine if and how the constraints were to be enforced and why the controls established to
enforce them were ineﬀective in that particular instance. If the controls had once been potentially
eﬀective but had degraded over time, the reasons for that degradation are identiﬁed.
2.2 Process Models
Besides constraints and hierarchical levels of control, a third basic concept in STAMP is that of
process models. Any controller—human or automated—must contain a model of the system being
controlled [3]. The ﬁgure below shows a typical control loop where an automated controller is
supervised by a human controller.
Automated Controller
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The model of the process (the plant, in control theory terminology) at one extreme may contain
only one or two variables (such as that required for a simple thermostat) while at the other extreme
it may require a complex model with a large number of state variables and transitions (such as
that needed for air traﬃc control). Whether the model is embedded in the control logic of an
automated controller or in the mental model of a human controller, it must contain the same type
of information: the required relationship among the system variables (the control laws), the current
state (the current values of the system variables), and the ways the process can change state. This
model is used to determine what control actions are needed, and it is updated through various
forms of feedback. When the model does not match the controlled process, accidents can result.
Accidents, particularly system accidents, often result from inconsistencies between the model
of the process used by the controllers (both human and automated) and the actual process state:
for example, (1) the software does not know that the plane is on the ground and raises the landing
gear or (2) the pilot does not identify an object as friendly and shoots a missile at it or (3) the
pilot thinks the aircraft controls are in speed mode but the computer has changed the mode to
open descent and the pilot issues inappropriate commands for that mode or (4) the computer does
not think the aircraft has landed and overrides the pilots’ attempts to operate the braking system.
All of these examples have actually occurred.
System accidents may also involve inadequate coordination among several controllers and deci-
sion makers, including unexpected side eﬀects of decisions or actions or conﬂicting control actions.
Communication ﬂaws play an important role here.
2 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF STAMP 6
Boundary Areas
Process 2
Overlapping Control
Process
Process 1
Controller 2
Controller 1
Controller 2
Controller 1
Leplat suggests that accidents are most likely in boundary areas or in overlap areas where two
or more controllers (human and/or automated) control the same process [5]. In both boundary and
overlap areas, the potential for ambiguity and for conﬂicts among independently made decisions
exists. When controlling boundary areas, there can be confusion over who is actually in control
(which control loop is currently exercising control over the process), leading to missing control
actions. The functions in the boundary areas are often poorly deﬁned.
Coordination problems in the control of boundary areas are rife. A Milstar satellite was lost due
to inadequate attitude control of the Titan/Centaur launch vehicle, which used an incorrect model
of the controlled process based on erroneous inputs in a software load tape. After the accident, it
was discovered that nobody had tested the software using the actual load tape—everyone assumed
someone else was doing so. A factor in the loss of the Black Hawk helicopters to friendly ﬁre over
northern Iraq in 1994 was that the helicopters normally ﬂew only in the boundary areas of the
No-Fly-Zone, and procedures for handling aircraft in those areas were ill-deﬁned.
Overlap areas exist when a function is achieved by the cooperation of two controllers or when two
controllers exert inﬂuence on the same object. Such overlap creates the potential for conﬂicting
control actions. In an A320 accident in Bangalore, India, the pilot had disconnected his ﬂight
director during approach and assumed that the co-pilot would do the same. The result would have
been a mode conﬁguration in which airspeed is automatically controlled by the autothrottle (the
speed mode), which is the recommended procedure for the approach phase. However, the co-pilot
had not turned oﬀ his ﬂight director, which meant that open descent mode became active when
a lower altitude was selected instead of speed mode, eventually contributing to the crash of the
aircraft short of the runway.
2.3 A Classification of Accident Factors
In STAMP, accidents result from inadequate control, i.e., the control loop creates or does not handle
dysfunctional interactions in the process—including interactions caused both by component failures
and by system design ﬂaws. Starting from this basic deﬁnition of an accident, the process that
leads to accidents can be understood in terms of ﬂaws in the components of the system development
and system operations control loops in place during design, development, manufacturing, and
operations. These ﬂaws can be classiﬁed and used during accident analysis or accident prevention
activities to assist in identifying all the factors involved in the accident. Figure 2 shows the general
classiﬁcation.
In each control loop at each level of the socio-technical control structure, unsafe behavior re-
sults from either a missing or inadequate constraint on the process at the lower level or inadequate
enforcement of the constraint leading to its violation. Because each component of the control loop
may contribute to inadequate control, classiﬁcation starts by examining each of the general control
3 USING STAMP TO ANALYZE A WATER CONTAMINATION ACCIDENT 7
(boundary and overlap areas)
(asynchronous evolution)
Process changes without appropriate change in control algorithm
Communication flaw
Inadequate Execution of Control Action
Flaws(s) in updating process (asynchronous evolution)
Inadequate sensor operation (incorrect or no information provided)
Time lag
Unidentified hazards
Inadequate Enforcement of Constraints (Control Actions) 
Inappropriate, ineffective, or missing control actions for identified hazards
Communication flaw 
Design of control algorithm (process) does not enforce constraints
Not provided in system design
Flaw(s) in creation process 
Incorrect modification or adaptation
Flaw(s) in creation process 
Process models inconsistent, incomplete, or incorrect (lack of linkup)
Inadequate or missing feedback
Inadequate coordination among controllers and decision  makers
Time lag
Inadequate actuator operation
Time lags and measurement inaccuracies not accounted for
2.1
.
1.2.3
2.2
2.3
1.2.2
.
1.2.1
1.2
3.1
3.2
3.3
1.1
1.
3.4
Figure 2: A Classiﬁcation of Control Flaws Leading to Hazards
loop components and evaluating their potential contribution: (1) the controller may issue inade-
quate or inappropriate control actions, including inadequate handling of failures or disturbances in
the physical process; (2) control actions may be inadequately executed, or (3) there may be missing
or inadequate feedback. These same general factors apply at each level of the socio-technical control
structure, but the interpretations (applications) of the factors at each level may diﬀer.
3 Using STAMP to analyze a Water Contamination Accident
As an example, we apply STAMP to an accident involving water contamination [8]. The accident
occurred in May 2000 in the small town of Walkerton, Ontario, Canada. Some contaminants, largely
Escherichia coli O157:H7 (the common abbreviation for which is E. coli) and Campylobacter jejuni
entered the Walkerton water system through a well of the Walkerton municipal water system.
The Walkerton water system was operated by the Walkerton Public Utilities Commission
(WPUC). Stan Koebel was the WPUC’s general manager and his brother Frank its foreman. In
May 2000, the water system was supplied by three groundwater sources: Wells 5, 6, and 7. The
water pumped from each well was treated with chlorine before entering the distribution system.
The source of the contamination was manure that had been spread on a farm near Well 5.
Unusually heavy rains from May 8 to May 12 carried the bacteria to the well. Between May 13
and May 15, Frank Koebel checked Well 5 but did not take measurements of chlorine residuals,
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although daily checks were supposed to be made.1 Well 5 was turned oﬀ on May 15.
On the morning of May 15, Stan Koebel returned to work after having been away fromWalkerton
for more than a week. He turned on Well 7, but shortly after doing so, he learned a new chlorinator
for Well 7 had not been installed and the well was therefore pumping unchlorinated water directly
into the distribution system. He did not turn oﬀ the well, but instead allowed it to operate without
chlorination until noon on Friday May 19, when the new chlorinator was installed.
On May 15, samples from the Walkerton water distribution system were sent to A&L Labs
for testing according to the normal procedure. On May 17, A&L Labs advised Stan Koebel that
samples from May 15 tested positive for E. coli and total coliforms. The next day (May 18) the
ﬁrst symptoms of widespread illness appeared in the community. Public inquiries about the water
prompted assurances by Stan Koebel that the water was safe. By May 19 the scope of the outbreak
had grown, and a pediatrician contacted the local health unit with a suspicion that she was seeing
patients with symptoms of E. coli.
The Bruce-Grey-Owen Sound (BGOS) Health Unit (the government unit responsible for public
health in the area) began an investigation. In two separate calls placed to Stan Koebel, the health
oﬃcials were told that the water was “okay.” At that time, Stan Koebel did not disclose the lab
results from May 15, but he did start to ﬂush and superchlorinate the system to try to destroy any
contaminants in the water. The chlorine residuals began to recover. Apparently, Mr. Koebel did
not disclose the lab results for a combination of two reasons: he did not want to reveal the unsafe
practices he had engaged in from May 15-17 (i.e., running Well 7 without chlorination), and he
did not understand the serious and potentially fatal consequences of the presence of E. coli in the
water system. He continued to ﬂush and superchlorinate the water through the following weekend,
successfully increasing the chlorine residuals. Ironically, it was not the operation of Well 7 without
a chlorinator that caused the contamination; the contamination instead entered the system through
Well 5 from May 12 until it was shut down May 15.
On May 20, the ﬁrst positive test for E. coli infection was reported and the BGOS Health
Unit called Stan Koebel twice to determine whether the infection might be linked to the water
system. Both times, Stan Koebel reported acceptable chlorine residuals and failed to disclose the
the adverse test results. The Health Unit assured the public that the water was safe based on the
assurances of Mr. Koebel.
That same day, a WPUC employee placed an anonymous call to the Ministry of the Environ-
ment (MOE) Spills Action Center, which acts as an emergency call center, reporting the adverse
test results from May 15. On contacting Mr. Koebel, the MOE was given an evasive answer and
Mr. Koebel still did not reveal that contaminated samples had been found in the water distribu-
tion system. The Local Medical Oﬃcer was contacted by the health unit, and he took over the
investigation. The health unit took their own water samples and delivered them to the Ministry of
Health laboratory in London (Ontario) for microbiological testing.
When asked by the MOE for documentation, Stan Koebel ﬁnally produced the adverse test
results from A&L Laboratory and the daily operating sheets for Wells 5 and 6, but said he could
not produce the sheet for Well 7 until the next day. Later, he instructed his brother Frank to
revise the Well 7 sheet with the intention of concealing the fact that Well 7 had operated without
a chlorinator. On Tuesday May 23, Stan Koebel provided the altered daily operating sheet to the
MOE. That same day, the health unit learned that two of the water samples it had collected on
May 21 had tested positive for E. coli.
Without waiting for its own samples to be returned, the BGOS health unit on May 21 had
1Low chlorine residuals are a sign that contamination is overwhelming the disinfectant capacity of the chlorination
process.
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issued a boil water advisory on local radio. About half of Walkerton’s residents became aware of
the advisory on May 21, with some members of the public still drinking the Walkerton town water
as late as May 23. The ﬁrst person died on May 22, a second on May 23, and two more on May
24. During this time, many children became seriously ill and some victims will probably experience
lasting damage to their kidneys as well as other long-term health eﬀects. In all, seven people died
and more than 2300 become ill.
Looking only at these proximate events, it appears that this is a simple case of incompetence,
negligence, and dishonesty by WPUC employees. In fact, the government argued at the Inquiry
that Stan Koebel or the Walkerton PUC were solely responsible for the outbreak and that they
were the only ones who could have prevented it. But a STAMP analysis provides a much more
informative and useful understanding of the accident and what might be changed to prevent future
repetitions (besides simply ﬁring the Koebel brothers). In fact, the stage for the accident had been
set over a large number of years by actions at all levels of the socio-technical system structure—an
example of how complex socio-technical systems can migrate toward an accident.
The dynamic forces that led to the accident had been in place for some time—some
going as far back as 20 years—yet the feedback to reveal the safety implications of these
forces was largely unavailable to the various actors in the system [12].
Even when the feedback is available, it may be ignored, as in Bhopal where safety auditors had
detected and reported the increasingly risky state of the plant two years earlier but none of the
recommended changes were made. As we will see, something similar happened at Walkerton.
Vicente and Christoﬀersen have used the Walkerton accident to test the explanatory adequacy
of Rasmussen’s [9] framework for risk management in a dynamic society [12]. In this paper, we use
the same accident to illustrate how STAMP can be used to analyze the Walkerton accident and to
show a sample notation that can be used to support STAMP analyses.
The ﬁrst step in creating a STAMP analysis is to identify the system hazards, the system safety
constraints, and the control structure in place to enforce the system safety constraints (see Section
3.1). Each component of the socio-technical control structure will have safety constraints relevant
to the particular functions of the component. Together, the safety constraints on all the components
must be adequate to enforce the overall system safety constraints.
We show the dynamic aspects of accidents in two ways. The ﬁrst model shows the changes in
the static safety control structure over time (see Section 3.2). These are essentially a series of static
snapshots of the control structure, and they do not show the dynamic processes in eﬀect that led
to the changes. For the latter, we use system dynamics models (see Section 3.3). At this point in
the analysis, it is possible to examine the proximate events and their relationship with the safety
control structure.
The third modeling eﬀort provides an overall explanation of the accident (Section 3.4). This
model contains a summary of the other models in terms of, for each of the control components, the
inadequate control actions and decisions and the factors (using the STAMP factors) that led to the
accident. This ﬁnal summary model provides the information necessary to make recommendations
to prevent future accidents arising from the same inadequate controls over safety.
3.1 The Socio-Technical Water Safety Control Structure
Figure 3 shows the basic Ontario water quality safety control structure. For space reasons, the
operations and development structures have been combined. The general system hazard related to
the accident is public exposure to E. coli or other health-related contaminants through drinking
water. This hazard leads to the following system safety constraint:
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The safety control structure must prevent exposure of the public to contaminated water.
1. Water quality must not be compromised.
2. Public health measures must reduce risk of exposure if water quality is compromised
(e.g., boil water advisories).
These general constraints must be enforced by requirements and constraints on the entire control
structure. The Canadian federal government (not shown in the ﬁgure) is responsible for establish-
ing a nationwide public health system and ensuring it is operating eﬀectively. Federal guidelines
are provided to the provinces, but responsibility for water quality is primarily delegated to the
individual provinces.
The Ontario government is responsible for regulating and overseeing the safety of Ontario’s
drinking water. It does this by providing budgets for the ministries involved, in this case the Min-
istry of the Environment (MOE), the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the Ministry of Agriculture,
Food, and Rural Aﬀairs, and by passing laws and adopting government policies aﬀecting water
safety.
The Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Rural Aﬀairs is responsible for regulating agricultural
activities with potential impact on drinking water sources. In fact, there was no watershed pro-
tection plan to protect the water system from agricultural runoﬀ. Instead, the Ministry of the
Environment was responsible for ensuring that the water systems could not be aﬀected by such
runoﬀ.
The Ministry of the Environment (MOE) has primary responsibililty for regulating and for
enforcing legislation, regulations, and policies that apply to the construction and operation of mu-
nicipal water systems. Guidelines and objectives are set by the MOE, based on Federal guidelines.
They are enforceable through Certiﬁcates of Approval issued to public water utilities operators,
under the Ontario Water Resources Act. The MOE also had legislative responsibility for building
and maintaining water treatment plants.
The Ministry of the Environment had two guidelines related to water safety. Note that guide-
lines, unlike regulations, are not legally binding. The Chlorination Bulletin required water systems
to treat well water with suﬃcient chlorine to inactivate any contaminants in the raw water and
to sustain a chlorine residual of 0.5 mg/L of water after 15 minutes of contact time. The Ontario
Drinking Water Objectives (ODWO) provided further guidelines on the operation of public water
systems, including a requirement for the water testing laboratories, which were almost all govern-
ment run, to report adverse test results directly to the MOE and to the local Medical Oﬃcer of
Health (part of the MOH). The Medical Oﬃcer of Health could then decide whether to issue a boil
water advisory.
The MOE was also responsible for public water system inspections and drinking water surveil-
lance, for setting standards for certiﬁcation of water system, and for continuing education require-
ments for operators to maintain competence as knowledge about water safety increased.
The Ministry of Health supervises local Health Units, in this case, the Bruce-Grey-Owen-Sound
(BGOS) Department of Health, run by local Oﬃcers of Health in executing their role in protecting
public health. The BGOS Medical Dept. of Health receives inputs from various sources, including
hospitals, the local medical community, the Ministry of Health, and the WPUC, and in turn is
responsible for issuing advisories and alerts if required to protect public health. Upon receiving
adverse water quality reports from the government testing labs or the MOE, the local public health
inspector in Walkerton would normally contact the WPUC to ensure that followup samples were
taken and chlorine residuals maintained.
The public water system in Walkerton is run by the Walkerton Public Utilities Commission
(WPUC), which operates the wells and is responsible for chlorination and for measurement of
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and Medical Dept. of Health
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Figure 3: The Basic Water Safety Control Structure. Lines going into the left of a box are control
lines. Lines from or to the top or bottom of a box represent information, feedback, or a physical
ﬂow. Rectangles with sharp corners are controllers while rectangles with rounded corners represent
plants.
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chlorine residuals. Oversight of the WPUC is provided by elected WPUC Commissioners. The
Commissioners were responsible for establishing and controlling the policies under which the PUC
operated, while the general manager (Stan Koebel) and staﬀ were responsible for administering
these policies in operating the water facility.
This then is the basic water safety control structure. The next step in the STAMP analysis is
to examine the changes in this structure leading to the accident.
3.2 Changes in the Safety Control Structure Leading Up to the Accident
The water safety control structure started out with some weaknesses that were mitigated by the
presence of other controls. As the other controls weakened or disappeared over time, the entire
socio-technical system moved to a state where a small change in the operation of the system or
in the environment (in this case, unusually heavy rain) could lead to a tragedy. Almost all the
information about the accident that follows is from the oﬃcial Walkerton Inquiry report [8] or from
a magazine article about the tragedy by a local farmer [4].
Walkerton Well 5 was built in 1978 and issued a Certiﬁcate of Approval by the MOE in 1979.
Despite potential problems—the groundwater supplying the well was recognized as being vulnerable
to surface contamination—no explicit operating conditions were imposed at the time. Well 5 was
a very shallow well: all of its water was drawn from an area between 5m and 8m below the surface.
More signiﬁcantly, the water was drawn from an area of bedrock, and the shallowness of the soil
overburden above the bedrock along with the fractured and porous nature of the bedrock itself
made it possible for surface bacteria to make its way to Well 5.
Although the original Certiﬁcate of Approval for Well 5 did not include any special operating
conditions, over time MOE practices changed. By 1992, the MOE had developed a set of model
operating conditions for water treatment and monitoring that were routinely attached to new
Certiﬁcates of Approval for municipal water systems. There was no eﬀort, however, to determine
whether such conditions should be attached to existing certiﬁcates, such as the one for Well 5.
The ODWO was amended in 1994 to require the continuous monitoring of chlorine residuals and
turbidity for wells supplied by a groundwater source that was under the direct inﬂuence of surface
water (as was Walkerton’s Well 5). Automatic monitoring and shutoﬀ valves would have mitigated
the operational problems at Walkerton and prevented the deaths and illness associated with the E.
coli contamination in May 2000 if the requirement had been enforced in existing wells. However,
at the time, there was no program or policy to review existing wells to determine whether they
met the requirements for continuous monitoring. In addition, MOE inspectors were not directed
to notify well operators (like the Koebel brothers) of the new requirement nor to assess during
inspections if a well required continuous monitoring. Stan and Frank Koebel lacked the training
and expertise to identify the vulnerability of Well 5 themselves and to understand the resulting
need for continuous chlorine residual and turbidity monitors.
Operating conditions should theoretically have been imposed by the municipality, the Walkerton
Public Utilities Commissioners, and the manager of the WPUC. The municipality left the operation
of the water system to the WPUC. The WPUC Commissioners, who were elected, became over the
years more focused on the ﬁnances of the PUC than the operations. They had little or no training
or knowledge of water system operations or even water quality itself. Without such knowledge and
with their focus on ﬁnancial issues, they gave all responsibility for operations to the manager of
the WPUC (Stan Koebel) and provided no other operational oversight.
The operators of the Walkerton water system did not intentionally put the public at risk. Stan
Koebel and the other WPUC employees believed the untreated water was safe and often drank it
themselves at the well sites. Local residents also pressed the WPUC to decrease the amount of
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chlorine used because they objected to the taste of chlorinated water.
Although Mr. Koebel knew how to operate the water system mechanically, he lacked knowledge
about the health risks associated with a failure to properly operate the system and of the importance
of following the MOE requirements for treatment and monitoring. This incorrect mental model was
reinforced when over the years he received mixed messages from the MOE about the importance
of several of its own requirements.
Before 1993, there were no mandatory certiﬁcation requirements for water system operators or
managers. Stan and Frank Koebel were not qualiﬁed to hold their positions within the WPUC,
but they were certiﬁed in 1993 through a grandfathering scheme based solely on experience. They
were not required to take a training course or to pass any examinations.
After the introduction of mandatory certiﬁcation in 1993, the MOE required 40 hours of training
a year for each certiﬁed operator. Stan and Frank Koebel did not take the required amount of
training, and the training they did take did not adequately address drinking water safety. The MOE
did not focus the training on drinking water safety and did not enforce the training requirements.
The Koebel brothers and the Walkerton commissioners were not the only ones with inadequate
training and knowledge of drinking water safety. Evidence at the Inquiry showed that several
environmental oﬃcers in the MOE’s local oﬃce were unaware that E. coli was potentially lethal
and their mental models were also incorrect with respect to other matters essential to water safety.
Without regulations or oversight or enforcement of safe operating conditions, and with inade-
quate mental models of the safety requirements, operating practices have a tendency to change over
time in order to optimize a variety of goals that conﬂict with safety. In the case of Walkerton, this
change began almost immediately. The Inquiry report says that many improper operating practices
had been going on for years before Stan Koebel became manager. He simply left them in place.
These practices, some of which went back 20 years, included misstating the locations at which
samples for microbiological testing were taken, operating wells without chlorination, making false
entries in daily operating sheets, failing to measure chlorine residuals daily, failing to adequately
chlorinate the water, and submitting false annual reports to the MOE.
All of these weaknesses in the control over the Walkerton (and other municipalities) water
quality might have been mitigated if the source of contamination of the water had been controlled.
A weakness in the basic water control structure was the lack of a government watershed and land
use policy for agricultural activities that can impact drinking water sources. In fact, at a meeting of
the Walkerton town council in November 1978 (when Well 5 was constructed), MOE representatives
suggested land use controls for the area around Well 5, but the municipality did not have the legal
means to enforce such land use regulations because the government of Ontario had not provided
the legal basis for such controls.
Walkerton is at the heart of Ontario’s Bruce county, a major farming area. Whereas the existing
water quality infrastructure and physical well designs were able to handle the amount of manure
produced when farms typically produced 50 or 60 animals at a time, the increase in factory farms
(each of which might have 1200 hogs) led to runoﬀ of agricultural contaminants and put pressure on
the drinking water quality infrastructure. At the time of the accident, the county had a population
of only 60,000 people, but had 163,000 beef cattle and 100,000 hogs. A single 1200 hog factory
farm can produce as much waste as 60,000 people and the entire animal population in the county at
that time produced as much waste as 1.6 million people. This animal waste is spread on the ﬁelds
adjacent to the farms, which cannot absorb such massive quantities of manure. Contamination
of the groundwater and surrounding waterways is the result. At the same time, the spreading of
manure had been granted a long-standing exemption from EPA requirements.
Annual reports of the Environment Commissioner of Ontario for the four years before the
Walkerton accident included recommendations that the government create a groundwater strategy.
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A Health Canada study stated that the cattle counties of Southwestern Ontario, where Walkerton
is located, are high-risk areas for E. coli infections. The report pointed out the direct link between
cattle density and E. coli infection, and showed that 32 percent of the wells in rural Ontario
showed fecal contamination. Dr. Murray McQuigge, the Medical Oﬃcer of Health for the BGOS
Health Unit (and the man who handled the Walkerton E. coli outbreak) warned in a memo to local
authorities that “poor nutrient management on farms is leading to a degradation of the quality of
ground water, streams, and lakes.” Nothing was done in response.
The control structure quickly started to degrade even further in eﬀectiveness with the election
of a conservative provincial government in 1995. A bias against environmental regulation and red
tape led to the elimination of many of the government controls over drinking water quality. A Red
Tape Commission was established by the provincial government to minimize reporting and other
requirements on government and private industry. At the same time, the government disbanded
groups like the Advisory Committee on Environmental Standards (ACES), which reviewed ministry
standards including those related to water quality. At the time of the Walkerton contamination,
there was no opportunity for stakeholder or public review of the Ontario clean water controls.
Budget and staﬀ reductions by the conservative government took a major toll on environmental
programs and agencies (although budget reductions had started before the election of the new
provincial government). The MOE budget was reduced by 42% and 900 of the 2400 staﬀ responsible
for monitoring, testing, inspection, and enforcement of environmental regulations were laid oﬀ. The
oﬃcial Walkerton Inquiry report concludes that the reductions were not based on an assessment
of the requirements to carry out the MOE’s statutory requirements nor on any risk assessment of
the potential impact on the environment or, in particular on water quality. After the reductions,
the Provincial Ombudsman issued a report saying that cutbacks had been so damaging that the
government was no longer capable of providing the services that it was mandated to provide. The
report was ignored.
In 1996, the Water Sewage Services Improvement Act was passed, which shut down the govern-
ment water testing laboratories, downloaded control of provincially owned water and sewage plants
to the municipalities, eliminated funding for municipal water utilities, and ended the provincial
Drinking Water Surveillance Program, under which the MOE had monitored drinking water across
the province.
The ODWO directed testing labs to report any indications of unsafe water quality to the MOE
and to the local Medical Oﬃcer Of Health. The latter would then decide whether to issue a
boil water advisory. When government labs conducted all of the routine drinking water tests for
municipal water systems throughout the province, it was acceptable to keep the notiﬁcation protocol
in the form of a guideline under the ODWO rather than a legally enforceable law or regulation.
However, the privatization of water testing and the exit of government labs from this duty in 1996
made the use of guidelines ineﬀective in ensuring necessary reporting would occur. At the time,
private environmental labs were not regulated by the government. No criteria were established to
govern the quality of testing or the qualiﬁcations or experience of private lab personnel, and no
provisions were made for licensing, inspection, or auditing of private labs by the government. In
addition, the government did not implement any program to monitor the eﬀect of privatization on
the notiﬁcation procedures followed whenever adverse test results were found.
At the time of privatization in 1996, the MOE sent a guidance document to those municipalities
that requested it. The document strongly recommended that a municipality include in any contract
with a private lab a clause specifying that the laboratory directly notify the MOE and the local
Medical Oﬃcer of Health about adverse test results. There is no evidence that the Walkerton PUC
either requested or received this document.
After laboratory testing services for municipalities were assumed by the private sector in 1996,
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the MOH Health Unit for the Walkerton area sought assurances from the MOE’s local oﬃce that the
Health Unit would continue to be notiﬁed of all adverse water quality results relating to community
water systems. It received that assurance, both in correspondence and at a meeting.
In 1997, the Minister of Health took the unusual step of writing to the Minister of the Environ-
ment requesting that legislation be amended to ensure that the proper authorites would be notiﬁed
of adverse water test results. The Minister of the Environment declined to propose legislation,
indicating that the ODWO dealt with the issue. On several occasions, oﬃcials in the MOH and the
MOE expressed concerns about failures to report adverse test results to local Medical Oﬃcers of
Health in accordance with the ODWO protocol. But the anti-regulatory culture and the existence
of the Red Tape Commission discouraged any proposals to make notiﬁcation legally binding on the
operators or municipal water systems and private labs.
The testing laboratory used by Walkerton in May 2000, A&L Canada Laboratories East, was
unaware of the notiﬁcation guideline in the ODWO. In fact, they considered test results to be
conﬁdential and thus improper to send to anyone but the client (in this case, the WPUC manager
Stan Koebel). The MOE had no mechanism for informing private laboratories of the existing
guidelines for reporting adverse results to the MOE.
Another important impact of the 1996 law was a reduction in the MOE water system inspection
program. The cutbacks at the MOE negatively impacted the number of inspections, although the
inspection program had other deﬁciencies as well.
The MOE inspected the Walkerton water system in 1991, 1995, and 1998. At the time of
the inspections, problems existed relating to water safety. Inspectors identiﬁed some of them, but
unfortunately two of the most signiﬁcant problems—the vulnerability of Well 5 to surface contam-
ination and the improper chlorination and monitoring practices of the PUC—were not detected.
Information about the vulnerability of Well 5 was available in MOE ﬁles, but inspectors were not
directed to look at relevant information about the security of water sources and the archived in-
formation was not easy to ﬁnd. Information about the second problem, improper chlorination and
monitoring practices of the WPUC, was there to be seen in the operating records maintained by
the WPUC. The Inquiry report concludes that a proper examination of the daily operating sheets
would have disclosed the problem. However, the inspectors were not instructed to carry out a
thorough review of operating records.
The 1998 inspection report did show there had been problems with the water supply for years:
detection of E. coli in treated water with increasing frequency, chlorine residuals in treated wa-
ter at less than the required 0.5 mg/L, non-compliance with minimum bacteriological sampling
requirements, and not maintaining proper training records.
The MOE outlined improvements that should be made, but desperately short of inspection
staﬀ and faced with small water systems across the province that were not meeting standards, it
never scheduled a follow-up inspection to see if the improvements were in fact being carried out.
The Inquiry report suggests that the use of guidelines rather than regulations had an impact here.
The report states that had the Walkerton PUC been found to be in non-compliance with a legally
enforceable regulation, as opposed to a guideline, it is more likely that the MOE would have taken
stronger measures to ensure compliance—such as the use of further inspections, the issuance of
a Director’s Order (which would have required the WPUC to comply with the requirements for
treatment and monitoring), or enforcement proceedings. The lack of any followup or enforcement
eﬀorts may have led the Koebel brothers to believe the recommendations were not very important,
even to the MOE.
The WPUC Commissioners received a copy of the 1998 inspection report but did nothing
beyond asking for an explanation from Stan Koebel and accepting his word that he would correct
the deﬁcient practices. They never followed up to make sure he did.
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The mayor of Walkerton and the municipality also received the report but they assumed the
WPUC would take care of the problems. When the local Walkerton public health inspector read the
report, he ﬁled it, assuming that the MOE would ensure that the problems identiﬁed were properly
addressed. Note the coordination problems here in an area of overlapping control (discussed in
Section 2.2). Both the MOE and the local public health inspector should have followed up on the
1998 inspection report, but there was no written protocol instructing the public health inspector
on how to respond to adverse water quality reports or inspection reports. The MOE also lacked
such protocols. The Province’s water safety control structure had clearly become ineﬀective.
A ﬁnal important change in the safety control structure involved the drinking water surveillance
program in which the MOE monitored drinking water across the province. In 1996, the Provincial
government dropped E. coli testing from its Drinking Water Surveillance Program. The next year,
the Drinking Water Surveillance Program was shut down entirely. At the same time, the provincial
government directed MOE staﬀ not to enforce dozens of environmental laws and regulations still
on the books. Farm operators, in particular, were to be treated with understanding if they were
discovered to be in violation of livestock and waste-water regulations. By June, 1998, the Walkerton
town council was concerned enough about the situation to send a letter directly to the Premier
(Mike Harris), appealing for the province to resume testing of municipal water. There was no reply.
MOE oﬃcials warned the government that closing the water testing program would endanger
public health. Their concerns were dismissed. In 1997, senior MOE oﬃcials drafted another memo
that the government did heed [4]. This memo warned that cutbacks had impaired the Ministry’s
ability to enforce environmental regulations to the point that the Ministry could be exposed to
lawsuits for negligence if and when an environmental accident occurred. In response, the Provincial
government called a meeting of the Ministry staﬀ to discuss how to protect itself from liability, and
it passed a Bill (“The Environmental Approvals Improvement Act”) which, among other things,
prohibited legal action against the government by anyone adversely aﬀected by the Environment
Minister’s failure to apply environmental regulations and guidelines.
Many other groups warned senior government oﬃcials, ministers, and the Cabinet of the danger
of what it was doing, such as reducing inspections and not making the notiﬁcation guidelines into
regulations. The warnings were ignored. Environmental groups prepared briefs. The Provincial
Auditor, in his annual reports, criticized the MOE for deﬁcient monitoring of groundwater resources
and for failing to audit small water plants across the province. The International Joint Commission
expressed its concerns about Ontario’s neglect of water quality issues, and the Environmental
Commissioner of Ontario warned that the government was compromising environmental protection,
pointing speciﬁcally to the testing of drinking water as an area of concern.
In January 2000 (three months before the Walkerton accident), staﬀ at the MOE’s Water Policy
Branch submitted a report to the Provincial government warning that “Not monitoring drinking
water quality is a serious concern for the Ministry in view of its mandate to protect public health.”
The report stated that a number of smaller municipalities were not up to the job of monitoring the
quality of their drinking water. It further warned that because of the privatization of the testing
labs, there was no longer a mechanism to ensure that the MOE and the local Medical Oﬃcer of
Health were informed if problems were detected in local water systems. The Provincial government
ignored the report.
The warnings were not limited to groups or individuals. Many adverse water quality reports
had been received from Walkerton between 1995 and 1998. During the mid to late 1990s, there
were clear indications that the water quality was deteriorating. In 1996, for example, hundreds
of people in Collingswood (a town near Walkerton), became ill after cryptosporidium (a parasite
linked to animal feces) contaminated the drinking water. Nobody died, but it should have acted
as a warning that the water safety control structure had degraded. Between January and April of
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Figure 4: The Basic Water Safety Control Structure at the Time of the Accident. Dotted lines
represent communication, control, or feedback channels that had become ineﬀective.
2000 (the months just prior to the May E. coli outbreak), the lab that tested Walkerton’s water
repeatedly detected coliform bacteria—an indication that surface water was getting into the water
supply. The lab notifed the MOE on ﬁve separate occasions. The MOE in turn phoned the WPUC,
was assured the problems were being ﬁxed, and let it go at that. The MOE failed to inform the
Medical Oﬃcer of Health, as by law it was required to do. One of the reasons for the delay in
issuing a boil water advisory when the symptoms of E. coli contamination started to appear in
Walkerton was that the latest report in the local Health Unit’s ﬁles of any problems with the water
was over two years old. In May 2000, Walkerton changed its testing lab to A&L Canada who, as
noted above, did not know about the reporting guidelines.
The Walkerton Inquiry report notes that the decisions to remove the water safety controls
in Ontario or to reduce their enforcement were taken without an assessment of the risks or the
preparation of a risk management plan. The report says there was evidence that those at the
most senior levels of government who were responsible for the decisions considered the risks to be
manageable, but there was no evidence that the speciﬁc risks were properly assessed or addressed.
All of these changes in the Ontario water safety control structure over time led to the modiﬁed
control structure shown in Figure 4. One thing to notice in comparing Figure 3 and Figure 4 is the
disappearance of many of the feedback loops. When the models are shown on a computer, graphics
can be used to illustrate and assist in understanding the changes in the control structure over time.
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3.3 Dynamic Process Model
As we have seen, the system’s defenses or safety controls may degrade over time due to changes
in the behavior of the components of the safety control loop. The reasons for the migration of
the system toward a state of higher risk will be system speciﬁc and can be quite complex. In
contrast to the usually simple and direct relationships represented in event chain accident models,
most accidents in complex systems involve relationships between events and human actions that are
highly non-linear, involving multiple feedback loops. The analysis or prevention of these accidents
therefore requires an understanding not only of the static structure of the system (the structural
complexity) and of the changes to this structure over time (the structural dynamics), but also
the dynamics behind these changes (the behavioral or dynamic complexity). The previous section
presented an approach to describing and analyzing the static safety control structure and how to
use that to describe the changes to that structure that occur over time. This section presents a way
to model and understand the dynamic processes behind the changes to the static control structure
and why it changed over time, potentially leading to ineﬀective controls and unsafe or hazardous
states.
The approach proposed uses the modeling techniques of system dynamics. The ﬁeld of system
dynamics, created at MIT in the 1950’s by Jay Forrester, is designed to help decision makers learn
about the structure and dynamics of complex systems, to design high leverage policies for sustained
improvement, and to catalyze successful implementation and change. Drawing on engineering
control theory and the modern theory of nonlinear dynamical systems, system dynamics involves
the development of formal models and simulators to capture complex dynamics and to create an
environment for organizational learning and policy design.
These ideas are particularly relevant when analyzing system accidents. The world is dynamic,
evolving, and interconnected, but we tend to make decisions using mental models that are static,
narrow, and reductionist. Thus decisions that might appear to have no eﬀect on safety—or even
appear to be beneﬁcial—may in fact degrade safety and increase risk. Using system dynamics, one
can, for example, understand and predict instances of policy resistance or the tendency for well-
intentioned interventions to be defeated by the response of the system to the intervention itself. A
companion paper submitted to this workshop presents archetypical system dynamic models often
associated with accidents.
Figure 5 shows a system dynamics model for the Walkerton accident. The basic structures
in the model are variables, stocks (represented by rectangles), and ﬂows (double arrows into and
out of stocks). Lines with arrows between the structures represent causality links, with a positive
polarity meaning that a change in the original variable leads to a change in the same direction in
the target variable. Similarly, a negative polarity means that a change in the original variable leads
to a change in the opposite direction of the target variable. Double lines across a link represent a
delay. Delays introduce the potential for instabilities in the system. Figure 5 shows a simpliﬁed
part of the model in Figure 6 to assist readers unfamiliar with system dynamics modeling.
Modeling the entire system dynamics is usually impractical. The challenge is to choose relevant
subsystems and model them appropriately for the intended purpose. STAMP provides the guidance
for determining what to model when the goal is risk management. In the example provided,
we focused primarily on the organizational factors, excluding the physical processes allowing the
mixing of manure with the source water. Depending on the scope or purpose of the model, diﬀerent
processes could be added or removed.
In complex systems, all dynamics, despite their complexity, arise from two types of feedback
loops [10]: positive (reinforcing) and negative (balancing). In system dynamics terms, degradation
over time of the safety control structure, as represented by reinforcing loops, would lead inevitably
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Figure 5: A Systems Dynamics Model for the Walkerton Water Contamination Accident
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Figure 6: A Part of the System Dynamics Model for Walkerton. This model describes how pressure
to cut budgets (an exogenous variable external to the model) leads to decreased oversight. The level
of oversight aﬀects training and certiﬁcation as well as inspection and monitoring, both of which
inpact risk. The loop on the left says that as oversight decreases, the incident and accident rate will
increase, which should decrease anti-regulatory pressures, thus leading to increased oversight and
thence to decreases in the accident rate. The delay between changes in oversight and changes in
the accident rate, however, introduces instabilities in the system (as is true in any control system).
The lack of immediate feedback from incidents and accidents after oversight is reduced contributes
to increased pressures to reduce oversight until the stage for a major tragedy is set.
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to an accident, but there are balancing loops, such as regulation and oversight that control those
changes. In Ontario, as feedback and monitoring controls were reduced, the mental model of the
central government leaders and the ministries responsible for water quality about the current state
of the water system became increasingly divorced from reality. A belief that the water quality
controls were in better shape than they actually were led to disregarding warnings and continued
reduction in what were regarded as unnecessary regulation and red tape.
Accidents occur when the balancing loops do not adequately overcome the inﬂuences degrading
the safety controls. Understanding why this degradation occurred (why risk increased) is an im-
portant part of understanding why the accident occurred and learning how to prevent repetitions
in the future, i.e. how to set up more eﬀective safety control structures. It is also an important
part of identifying when the socio-technical system is moving toward a state of unacceptable risk.
Our Walkerton model includes a number of exogenous variables (pressure to cut budgets, at-
tempts by a conservative government to reduce business and government red tape, etc.) that act as
levers on the behaviors of the system. When these variables are changed without any consideration
of the dynamics of the system being modeled, the eﬀectiveness of the safety control structure can
deteriorate progressively, with few if any visible signs. For instance, the attempts to reduce red
tape decreased the oversight of the ministries and municipalities. This decrease in oversight in
turn had a negative eﬀect on the control and communication channels between the government and
the laboratories performing water quality analyses. Eventually, the laboratories stopped reporting
the results of the tests. Because of this lack of reporting, the Walkerton municipality was much
slower to realize that the water was contaminated, leading to a delay in the mobilization of the
resources needed to deal with the contamination, and the eﬀectiveness of the advisories issued was
thus greatly diminished, increasing the risk of infection in the population.
Accident investigations often end with blame being assigned to particular individuals, often
inﬂuenced by legal or political factors. The system dynamics models, on the other hand, can show
how the attitude and behavior of individuals is greatly aﬀected by the rest of the system and how
and why such behavior may change over time. For instance, operator competence depends on the
quality of training, which increases with government oversight but may decrease over time without
such oversight due to competing pressures. An operator’s fear of punishment, which in this case
led Stan Koebel to lie about the adverse water quality test reports, is balanced by compliance with
existing rules and regulations. This compliance, in turn, is directly inﬂuenced by the extent of
government oversight and by the government’s response to similar behavior in the past.
Note that even though the STAMP analysis of the Walkerton water system contamination
provided thus far has not yet even gotten to the point where most accident investigations start—
the proximate events to the loss—it is clear that the system was in a state where the risk of an
accident was very high and a lot of diﬀerent scenarios (or triggers) could have led to a tragedy. Most
of the information required to understand the reasons for this accident (or at least the context in
which it happened and why it was likely to occur) are outside the usual proximate chain of events
used to describe the cause of an accident and to identify a “root cause.”
3.4 Summary Accident Analysis (Causal Analysis)
At this point it is now possible to show the proximate events and see how they combined with
the inadequate safety control structure at the time to lead to the Walkerton E. coli contamination.
A STAMP analysis shows the interactions not as a chain of events showing direct relationships
between events but in terms of the implications and feedback relationships on the safety control
structure. For space reasons, we will not repeat a description of the events nor show them on the
control structure.
4 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 22
The ﬁnal model, the summary accident analysis, consists of a description of the inadequate
control actions by each of the components in the water safety control structure and the reasons for
these actions using the accident factors in STAMP (e.g., ﬂawed mental models, lack of coordination
among controllers, inadequate control algorithms or inadequate execution of acceptable control
algorithms, missing feedback loops, etc.). Figure 3.4 shows the ﬁnal accident analysis model for
the Walkerton accident.
The ﬁnal accident summary, along with the systems dynamics model, provides the information
necessary for devising recommendations and changes that do not simply ﬁx symptoms but eliminate
the root causes (the inadequate controls in STAMP terminology) of the accident. Despite the
government’s argument that the accident was solely due to actions by Stan Koebel and the WPUC,
after the accident many recommendations and changes were made to ﬁx the problems noted here
including establishing regulatory requirements for agricultural activities with potential impacts
on drinking water sources, updating of standards and technology, improving current practices
in setting standards, establishing legally enforceable regulations rather than guidelines, requiring
mandatory training for all water system operators and requiring grandparented operators to pass
certiﬁcation examinations within two years, developing a curriculum for operator training and
mandatory training requirements speciﬁcally emphasizing water quality and safety issues, adopting
a province-wide drinking water policy and a Safe Drinking Water Act, strictly enforcing drinking
water regulations, and commiting suﬃcient resources (ﬁnancial and otherwise) to enable the MOE
to play their role eﬀectively.
The Walkerton Inquiry report did an excellent job, which is why the information was available
to create the STAMP models. Most accident reports do not dig as deeply into the root causes
of the accident. STAMP was developed to assist in determining what questions should be asked
during investigations to maximize the learning process.
4 Conclusions and Future Work
The use of a systems-theoretic accident model like STAMP does not lead to identifying single causal
factors or variables. It will thus not be terribly satisfying to those focused on ﬁnding someone or
something to blame. It does, however, a much better job than chain of events models in providing
information about the changes that are needed to prevent accidents in the future, particularly
changes to the organizational structure and to engineering design, manufacturing, and operations.
Our future goals are to add more sophisticated human error and decision making models to
STAMP, to apply the model to hazard analysis and accident prevention, and to explore the im-
plications for new approaches to risk assessment and risk management. We are also working on
tool support for graphically displaying and animating the models (including simulating the system
dynamics models) and for providing assistance in creating them.
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Ministry of the Environment
Provincial Government
No systematic review of existing certificates of approval to determine if conditions should be added for continuous monitoring.
(Privatizing without establishing adequate governmental oversight)
Private labs not informed about reporting guidelines.
No followup on inspection reports noting serious deficiencies.
Approval of Well 5 without attaching operating conditions or special monitoring or inspection requirements.
MOE inspectors not directed to assess existing wells during inspections.
Did not require continuous monitoring of existing facilities when ODWO amended in 1994.
Did not retroactively apply new approvals program to older facilities when procedures changed in 1992.
Relied on voluntary compliance with regulations and guidelines. 
No legally enforceable measures taken to ensure that concerns identified in inspections are addressed.  Weak response to repeated
Inadequate Control Actions:
Budget cuts and staff reductions
Critical information about history of known vulnerable water sources not easily accessible.
Context in Which Decisions Made:
No law to legislate requirements for drinking water standards,  reporting requirements, and infrastructure funding.
Environmental controls systematically removed or negated.
Incorrect model of state of compliance with water quality regulations and guidelines.
Establish feedback channels for adverse test results.  Provide multiple paths so that dysfunctional paths cannot prevent reporting.
Ensure those in charge of water supplies are competent to carry out their responsibilities.
Enforce legislation, regulations, and policies applying to construction and operation of municipal water systems.
Establish criteria for determining whether a well is at risk.
Perform continual risk evaluation of existing facilities and establish new controls if necessary.
Perform hazard analyses to provide information about where vulnerabilities are and monitor them.
Perform inspections and enforce compliance if problems found.
Safety Requirements and Constraints:
violations uncovered in periodic inspections.
No certification or training requirements for grandfathered operators.
No risk assessment or risk  management plan created to determine extent of known risks, whether risks should be assumed, and if assumed,
No monitoring or feedback channels established to evaluate impact of changes
Feedback:
Ignored warnings about deteriorating water quality.
Disbanded ACES.
No accreditation of water testing labs (no criteria established to govern quality of testing personnel, no provisions for licensing, inspection,
Water Sewage Services Improvement Act ended provincial Drinking Water Surveillance program
Spreading of manure exempted from EPA requirements for Certificates of Approval
No regulatory requirements for agricultural activities that create impacts on drinking water sources.
Privatized laboratory testing of drinking water without requiring labs to notify MOE and health authorities of adverse test results. 
whether they could be managed.
Inadequate Control Actions:
Relied on guidelines rather than legally enforceable regulations.
Establish certification and training requirements for water system operators.
Did not monitor effects of privatization on reporting of adverse test results.
Neither MOE nor MOH took responsibility for enacting notification legislation.
Coordination:
Feedback:
Several local MOE personnel did not know E. coli could be fatal.
Mental Model Flaws:
Did not inform Walkerton Medical Officer of Health about adverse test results in January to April 2000 as required to do. 
MOE inspectors not provided with criteria for determining whether a given well was at risk.  Not directed to examine daily operating sheets.
or auditing by government).
Inadequate inspections and improperly structured and administered inspection program..
Inadequate training of MOE personnel.
No enforcement of continuing training requirements.
Efforts to reduce red tape.
Ensure adequate risk assessment is conducted and effective risk management plan is in place.
Context in Which Decisions Made:
Anti−regulatory culture. 
Enact legislation to protect water quality.
Safety Requirements and Constraints:
Provide oversight and feedback loops to ensure that provincial regulatory bodies are doing their job adequately.
Provide adequate resources to regulatory bodies to carry out their responsibilities.
Establish regulatory bodies and codes of responsibilities, authority, and accountability for the province.
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Ensure adequate procedures exist for notificatoin and risk abatement if water quality is compromised.
Inadequate Control Actions:
Safety Requirements and Constraints:
No written protocol provided to local public health inspector on how to respond to adverse water quality or inspection reports.
Provide timely and accurate reports on testing results to MOE, WPUC, and Medical Dept. of Health (MOH)
Did not follow provincial guidelines and inform MOE and MOH of adverse test results.
Considered results to be proprietary.
Did not know about reporting guidelines;
Mental Model Flaws:
Inadequate Control Actions:
Safety Requirements and Constraints:
E. coli most commonly spread through meat.
A&L Canada Laboratories
Local (BGOS) Medical Dept. of Health
Safety Requirements and Constraints:
Illness surfacing in communities outside Walkerton
Most recent water quality reports over 2 years old.
Context in Which Decisions Made:
Issue boil water and other advisories if public health at risk.
Follow up on adverse drinking water quality reports.
Provide oversight of drinking water quality.
Ministry of Health
Thought  were receiving adverse water quality reports after privatization.
Mental Model Flaws:
Relied on Stan Koebel to identify and resolve any concerns related to operation of the water supply.  Did not monitor to ensure problems fixed.  
Concentrated only on financial matters.
Inadequate Control Actions:
No training or educational requirements.
Elected officials
Context in Which Decisions Made:
Oversee operations to ensure water quality is not compromised.
Safety Requirements and Constraints:
Little knowledge of water safety and operation of system.;
Coordination:
Assumed MOE was ensuring inspection report problems were resolved.
Thought Stan Koebel was relaying the truth.
Unaware of reports of E. coli linked to treated water source.
Mental Model Flaws:
Public health inspector did not follow up on 1998 Walkerton inspection report.
Advisory should have been more widely disseminated.
Advisory delayed.
Inadequate Control Actions:
WPUC Commissioners
Unaware of improper treatment and monitoring practices of WPUC operators.
Did not establish, oversee,  nor enforce policies and practices for operating the Walkerton public water system.
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Local Operations
Inadequate response after first symptoms in community
Did not use adequate doses of chlorine.
Physical Process
Unusually heavy rains transport manure spread on fields
Fractured and porous bedrock provides route from surface to aquifer
Shallow locationNo chlorinator installed
Design Flaw:
Minimal overburden provides little natural filtration
Design Flaw:
Walkerton PUC Operations Management
Farm
Well 7 Well 5
Mental Model Flaws:
Did not maintain proper training or operations records.
Update knowledge as required.
Inadequate Control Actions:
Problems discovered during inspections not rectified.
Believed sources for water system were generally safe.  Thought untreated water safe to drink.
Adverse test results not reported when asked.
Inadequate monitoring and supervision of operations
Did not believe guidelines were a high priority.
Did not understand health risks posed by underchlorinated water.
Did not understand risks of bacterial contaminants like E. coli.
Did not take measurements of chlorine residuals for Well 5 between May 13 and May 15 (after symptoms of problems appeared).
Thought convenience was acceptable basis for sampling.
Inadequate training led to inadequate understanding of job responsibilities.
Mental Model Flaws:
Greatly increased farm operations.Context:
Operated Well 7 without a chllorinator.
Misstated locations from which samples had been collected.
Did not measure chlorine residuals on most days.  Only started measuring in 1998.
Made fictitious entires for residuals in daily operating sheets.
Inadequate Control Actions:
Lacked adequate training.
Context in Which Decisions Made:
Apply adequate doses of chlorine to kill bacteria.
Measure chlorine residuals.
Safety Requirements and Constraints:
Lacked adequate training and expertise.
Improper activities were established practice for 20 years.
Complaints by citizens about chlorine taste in drinking water.
Context in Which Decisions Made:
Keep accurate records.
Monitor operations to ensure that sample taking and reporting is accurate and adequate chlorination is being performed.
Safety Requirements and Constraints:
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